Meet on Afghanistan

The Arunachal Times

16 February 2010

Features

Meet on Afghanistan

Wrong timing, cosmetic pledges

By Monish Tourangbam

Another cosmetic, detail-starved international conference on Afghanistan came to an end. The escapist mindset of the NATO countries almost amounts to sending a congratulatory note to the resurgent Taliban. With an exit plan being consented to by the war-fatigued nations, the insurgents knows that time is on their side and that they just have to hang on and wait for the foreign forces to leave.

The whole debate on “Good Taliban Vs Bad Taliban” and the plan to buy off elements of the Taliban willing to desert comes at a wrong juncture when the insurgents seem convinced that they are winning the war. It would have seemed more plausible in case the coalition forces were winning convincingly on the battlefield and affected a favorable opinion from the local populace towards their presence. This is certainly not the case.

The communiqué of the conference focusing on securing, stabilizing and developing Afghanistan, largely hinged on the vague idea of striking deals with the so-called “Good Taliban”. The principle element of success of the conference lies on a false assumption that many of the Taliban foot-soldiers join the insurgency out of economic compulsions. This is a simplified view, deliberately put forth to justify the strategy of reintegration.

The problem is much more complex, rooted in morphed versions of history and religion. A short-sighted vision to hastily pull down the curtains on the counter-insurgency operations would seriously derail the country into another era of xenophobia and fanatical religious conservatism. The facts on the ground indicate that the insurgency has gained the upper hand in recent times, and the Karzai government which came back to power in a fraud-tainted election is in a precarious condition. It stands accused of high-level corruption, of fostering ties with regional warlords to cling to power.

President Karzai finds himself in a pitiful position, not yet able to conjure up a cabinet acceptable by the national parliament. The Taliban strikes different parts of the country, including the capital, with impunity. Add to this the disdain for the foreign forces which seem to be spreading among the local populace. The insurgents are in high-spirits for forcing the coalition army to war-fatigue and the buying-off strategy is not meant for an opposition who is confident of winning the war. For such a strategy to work, the Taliban have to be subdued in the battlefield to an extent where deserting might seem an attractive option for large sections of the cadres, not when the insurgents feel that the foreign forces are on the run and compelled to exit. Indeed, according to US intelligence estimates, the Taliban now has shadow governments in 33 of the 34 provinces, raising questions over the entire strategy of motivating the Taliban to reintegrate.

Keeping in mind its domestic audiences, the Obama administration has given a timeframe to start the withdrawal process but at the same time, decided for a troop surge and increased commitment from other NATO countries. But, nations are clearly strained. For instance, two days before the London summit, Germany, the third largest contributor to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, announced an increase of only 500 extra soldiers plus a so-called "flexible reserve" force of 350 deployable at short notice — far fewer than Washington had hoped for. Moreover, the emphasis is on training Afghan forces rather than engaging in frontline fighting.

If the strategy revolves around providing job opportunities to the insurgents who decide to come under the government’s wing, then the process seems wistful as of now. High Unemployment levels remain one of the basic issues in Afghanistan. The government, with assistance from other countries cannot create enough job opportunities for normal hard-working citizens. So, are the jobs waiting for these “good insurgents” to convert and re-enter civil society?

There is no clarity yet as to how the government or for that matter the international community would manufacture opportunities for these young men who seem just “fine” in their present “avatars”, giving foreign forces hard times in the mountainous country. Now, if the plan is to pay free-cheques to the Taliban deserters, then what is the back-up plan in case they decide to go back and join their brothers after exercising their rights to some easy legitimate money? The reintegration process, without due monitoring, also runs the risk of jeopardizing the whole purpose. The plan may also become an easy springboard for Taliban cadres to infiltrate the Afghan national army.

Improving the Afghan forces to take over the security of the country in a phased manner was one of the highlights. But, the presence and influence of the government is highly limited with the Taliban ruling the roosts in major parts and even the local populace seems to highly discredit the government machineries. Add to this the menace of the drug money and addiction, and we have a post-card chaos and utter failure of governance. Hardly any substantial effort has been spelled out towards mitigating these issues. The conference concentrated on quick-fixing the fractures with some half-cooked ideas, to enable the western countries to have a face-saving exit. In late 2009 it was estimated that 10,000 out of the 94,000 Afghan soldiers, who had been trained so far had simply disappeared. Besides, 15 per cent of the Afghan army, and up to 60 per cent of the Afghan police in Helmand province, are estimated to be drug addicts.

As the return of Taliban looks more plausible with plans to strike deals with the “Good Taliban”, Afghan women are on their toes, fearing that their hard-won freedom is in jeopardy. Even as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged the concerns, she could at best offer a diplomatic soothing balm that the Taliban have to abide by the conditions of the peace deal. As fear and concern mounts of the impending danger, the Afghan government failed to include even one woman in its delegation to London. When Orsana Ashraf, founder, Humanitarian Assistance for the Women and Children of Afghanistan, lobbied officials to ask for women's views to be properly represented, she got a curt response: “this isn't ladies' business; this is about security."

India, a major victim of terrorism that has categorically refused to swallow the idea of “Good Taliban Vs Bad Taliban” was clearly sidelined in the international conference. Yet again, the world community, spearheaded by the US and the UK, bought Islamabad’s bargain that it could help strike a deal with the Taliban. Pakistan which helped bring about the Taliban in the 90s, now sells itself as the panacea of the disease, and the Obama administration seems content on consenting as long as it delivers some myopic foreign policy objectives. The prospects of any positive development look grim in the event of a hasty withdrawal and an eventual Taliban takeover duly sustained by the Pakistani military. In overlooking India’s soft diplomacy and its contribution to the Afghan reconstruction, the international community is setting a bad precedent in world politics, where force is often the most preferred option. ---INFA